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Dem Ransomware-as-a-Service-Geschäftsmodell von REvil einen Schritt voraus sein

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13
Februar 2022
13
Februar 2022
In diesem Blog werden die Auswirkungen der jüngsten Verhaftungen im Zusammenhang mit der cyberkriminellen Gruppe REvil im breiteren Kontext des Ransomware-as-a-Service-Geschäftsmodells bewertet. Dabei wird eine reale Ransomware-Kampagne von REvil untersucht, die von der Darktrace KI entdeckt wurde.

REvil, auch bekannt als Sodinokibi, ist eine Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)-Bande, die für einen der größten Ransomware-Angriffe der Geschichte verantwortlich ist. Am 14. Januar 2022 gab Russland bekannt, dass es 14 Mitglieder der kriminellen Bande verhaftet hat. Dieser Schritt erfolgte auf Ersuchen der US-Behörden, die gemeinsam mit internationalen Partnern hart gegen die Hacker vorgegangen sind. Im vergangenen Jahr wurden mehrere aufsehenerregende Angriffe der REvil-Gruppe zugeschrieben, darunter die Ransomware von JBS und die Vorfälle in der Lieferkette von Kaseya.

Die Verhaftungen sind sicherlich ein Sieg für die westlichen Strafverfolgungsbehörden und folgen auf die Ankündigung von Europol im November, dass in den vorangegangenen Monaten sieben REvil-Mitglieder verhaftet worden waren. Die Frage ist: Inwieweit werden diese Verhaftungen die Machenschaften der Kriminellen stören, und für wie lange?

Erste Hinweise von Sicherheitsforschern bei ReversingLabs deuten darauf hin, dass die REvil-Aktivität nicht beeinträchtigt wurde. Die Statistiken über REvil-Implantate sind zwei Wochen nach den russischen Verhaftungen unverändert und deuten eher auf einen leichten Anstieg hin.

Diese anhaltende Aktivität lässt auf eines von zwei Szenarien schließen:

  • Die zahlreichen Verhaftungen betrafen nur die "Mittelsmänner" in der Hierarchie der kriminellen Organisation
  • Das Ransomware-as-a-Service-Modell von REvil ist widerstandsfähig genug, um Störungen durch Strafverfolgungsbehörden zu überstehen

Beide Szenarien sind besorgniserregend für diejenigen, die Ransomware-Banden zum Opfer fallen könnten. Die Realität ist wahrscheinlich eine viel komplexere Mischung aus diesen und anderen Faktoren. Das Durchgreifen gegen Ransomware ist längst überfällig, aber der Kampf wird wahrscheinlich sehr langwierig sein. Die Strafverfolgungsbehörden müssen das Geschäftsmodell so weit unterbinden, dass es nicht mehr rentabel ist, im Ransomware-Geschäft mitzumischen. Dies wird wahrscheinlich Monate oder sogar Jahre in Anspruch nehmen.

Die Bekämpfung von Ransomware spielt sich auf der größten Bühne ab. Welchen Trost können Sicherheitsteams aus den jüngsten Ereignissen ziehen, wenn es überhaupt einen gibt?

Dem sich entwickelnden RaaS-Modell mit KI immer einen Schritt voraus

Ein gemeinsamer Bericht über Ransomware, der kürzlich vom FBI, CISA, NCSC, ACSC und der NSA veröffentlicht wurde, zeigt die wichtigsten Trends des vergangenen Jahres auf:

  • RaaS hat sich zunehmend professionalisiert, Geschäftsmodelle und Prozesse sind inzwischen gut etabliert.
  • Das Geschäftsmodell erschwert die Zuordnung, da es komplexe Netzwerke von Entwicklern, Partnern und Freiberuflern gibt.
  • Ransomware-Gruppen tauschen Informationen über ihre Opfer untereinander aus, wodurch die Bedrohung für Unternehmen noch vielfältiger wird.

Zusammenfassend zeigt der Bericht, wie Ransomware-Banden immer anpassungsfähiger werden, wenn es darum geht, die Strafverfolgung zu umgehen und den Gewinn aus Lösegeldzahlungen zu maximieren. Mehrere Gruppen sind verschwunden oder haben sich zurückgezogen, nur um unter einem anderen Namen und mit einer leicht veränderten Strategie wieder aufzutauchen. Die Taktiken, Techniken und Verfahren (TTPs) unterscheiden sich von Opfer zu Opfer, was vor allem daran liegt, dass die Angriffe von verschiedenen Ransomware-Betreibern und angeschlossenen Unternehmen durchgeführt werden.

Dies ist beunruhigend für die Strafverfolgungsbehörden, die versuchen, gegen die Personen vorzugehen, die hinter diesen Angriffen stecken. Wenn eine RaaS-Gruppe wie REvil aus einem amorphen und sich ständig verändernden Netz von Partnern besteht, ist die Verhaftung einzelner Personen ein ständiges Hinterherlaufen und wird die Gruppe als Ganzes wahrscheinlich nicht zu Fall bringen.

Der gleiche Kampf spielt sich auch auf der Ebene einzelner Angriffskampagnen ab. Sicherheitstools, die sich auf die Merkmale früherer Bedrohungen konzentrieren, befinden sich ebenfalls in einer ständigen Aufholjagd: Bis ein einzelner Angriff erkannt, mit Fingerabdrücken versehen und für das nächste Mal gespeichert ist, haben sich die Angreifer und ihre Techniken bereits weiterentwickelt.

Aber es gibt noch eine andere Möglichkeit für Verteidiger, die zunehmend auf selbstlernende KI setzen, um Angreifern einen Schritt voraus zu sein. Indem sie Ihre digitale Umgebung erlernt und subtile Abweichungen identifiziert, die auf einen Angriff hindeuten, kann diese Technologie neuartige Angriffe bereits beim ersten Auftreten erkennen und darauf reagieren. Unten sehen Sie ein Beispiel dafür, wie die selbstlernende KI einen Angriff von REvil ohne Regeln oder Signaturen erkannt hat.

REvil Angriffe finden

Im Sommer 2021 startete ein REvil-Tochterunternehmen einen Angriff auf eine Organisation des Gesundheits- und Sozialwesens. Ein Sektor, in dem die Zahl der Cyberangriffe seit Beginn der weltweiten Pandemie stark zugenommen hat. Der Angriff wurde zwar von der KI ohne Verwendung von Regeln oder Signaturen erkannt, aber das Sicherheitsteam überwachte Darktrace zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht. Da die autonome Reaktionentgegen aller Warnungen nicht live geschalten war, konnte der Angriff fortgesetzt werden.

Nachdem sich der Angreifer über den Laptop eines Remote-Mitarbeiters Zugang zum Netzwerk verschafft hatte, konnte er eine legitime Remote-Desktop-Verbindung (RDP) zu einem Jump-Server des Unternehmens missbrauchen, um weitere Anmeldedaten abzufangen.

Sobald der Angreifer über weitere Anmeldeinformationen verfügte, stellte er über RDP eine Verbindung zu mehreren internen Geräten her, darunter auch zu einem zweiten Jump-Server. Die Datenexfiltration begann von dem ursprünglich kompromittierten Server über den RDP-Port 3389.

Zwei Wochen später identifizierte der Angreifer die Kronjuwelen der Organisation, die auf einem dritten Server gespeichert waren, und versuchte, die Command-and-Control-Kommunikation (C2) zu initiieren. Der Server stellte eine Reihe ungewöhnlicher externer Verbindungen her, darunter Versuche, sich mit einer seltenen Domain zu verbinden, die dem Aktivitätsmuster ähnelte, das mit der früheren Kaseya-Ransomware-Kampagne von REvil verbunden war.

Darktrace for Endpoint, das auf Remote-Benutzergeräten ausgeführt wurde, sorgte für zusätzliche Transparenz und ermöglichte es dem Sicherheitsteam, das ursprünglich gefährdete Benutzergerät zu ermitteln. Wäre Antigena auf dem Endpunkt aktiv gewesen, hätte es eingegriffen, um diese ungewöhnliche Aktivität zu stoppen, indem es die spezifischen ungewöhnlichen Verbindungen blockiert hätte. Der Angriff wäre eingedemämmt worden, ohne den regulären Geschäftsbetrieb zu beeinträchtigen.

Verknüpfung der Punkte eines Low-and-Slow-Angriffs

Die Gesamtverweildauer der Angreifer betrug 22 Tage. Sie waren geduldig und führten ihre Aktionen in Schüben durch. Oftmals lagen Tage dazwischen. Dieses Verhaltensmuster ist für Ransomware-Angriffe nicht ungewöhnlich, insbesondere für solche, die das RaaS-Modell verwenden, bei dem jeder Schritt von verschiedenen Bandenmitgliedern oder verbundenen Unternehmen ausgeführt werden kann.

Der Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst war in der Lage, den gesamten Lebenszyklus des Angriffs über mehrere Wochen in Echtzeit zu verfolgen und die einzelnen Phasen des Angriffs zu einem kohärenten Sicherheitsvorfall zusammenzufügen.

Abbildung 1: Der Cyber AI Analyst zeigt die komplette Angriffskette auf

Neuer Name, gleiches Spiel

Bei diesem Angriff handelt es sich um einen weiteren Fall von Bedrohungsakteuren, die sehr gezielt vorgehen: Sie nutzen legitime Programme und Prozesse, die bereits in der Umgebung verwendet wurden, um bösartige Aktivitäten durchzuführen. Dies kann mit herkömmlichen Tools, die auf statischen Anwendungsfällen basieren und eine legitime RDP-Sitzung nicht von einer bösartigen unterscheiden können, sehr schwer zu erkennen sein.

Da cyberkriminelle Gruppen wie REvil weiterhin den Bemühungen der Strafverfolgungsbehörden trotzen, müssen Unternehmen mit KI-Technologie, die ihre Umgebung erlernt, aufrüsten. Autonomous Response wird bereits von Tausenden von Unternehmen in allen Bereichen der digitalen Infrastruktur eingesetzt - von E-Mail- und Cloud-Diensten bis hin zu Endgeräten, um Ransomware-Angriffe frühzeitig zu stoppen, bevor eine Verschlüsselung erfolgt.

Wir danken der Analystin Petal Beharry von Darktrace für ihren Einblick in die oben genannte Bedrohungslage.

Technische Einzelheiten

Darktrace Modell-Erkennungen:

  • Device / RDP Scan
  • Device / Bruteforce Activity
  • Compliance / Outbound Remote Desktop
  • Anomalous Connection / Upload via Remote Desktop
  • Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel
  • Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe
  • Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints

EINBLICKE IN DAS SOC-Team
Darktrace Cyber-Analysten sind erstklassige Experten für Threat Intelligence, Threat Hunting und Incident Response. Sie bieten Tausenden von Darktrace Kunden auf der ganzen Welt rund um die Uhr SOC-Support. Einblicke in das SOC-Team wird ausschließlich von diesen Experten verfasst und bietet Analysen von Cyber-Vorfällen und Bedrohungstrends, die auf praktischen Erfahrungen in diesem Bereich basieren.
AUTOR
ÜBER DEN AUTOR
Oakley Cox
Analyst Technical Director, APAC

Oakley is a technical expert with 5 years’ experience as a Cyber Analyst. After leading a team of Cyber Analysts at the Cambridge headquarters, he relocated to New Zealand and now oversees the defense of critical infrastructure and industrial control systems across the APAC region. His research into cyber-physical security has been published by Cyber Security journals and CISA. Oakley is GIAC certified in Response and Industrial Defense (GRID), and has a Doctorate (PhD) from the University of Oxford.

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

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22
Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

References

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

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Sliver C2: How Darktrace Provided a Sliver of Hope in the Face of an Emerging C2 Framework

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17
Apr 2024

Offensive Security Tools

As organizations globally seek to for ways to bolster their digital defenses and safeguard their networks against ever-changing cyber threats, security teams are increasingly adopting offensive security tools to simulate cyber-attacks and assess the security posture of their networks. These legitimate tools, however, can sometimes be exploited by real threat actors and used as genuine actor vectors.

What is Sliver C2?

Sliver C2 is a legitimate open-source command-and-control (C2) framework that was released in 2020 by the security organization Bishop Fox. Silver C2 was originally intended for security teams and penetration testers to perform security tests on their digital environments [1] [2] [5]. In recent years, however, the Sliver C2 framework has become a popular alternative to Cobalt Strike and Metasploit for many attackers and Advanced Persistence Threat (APT) groups who adopt this C2 framework for unsolicited and ill-intentioned activities.

The use of Sliver C2 has been observed in conjunction with various strains of Rust-based malware, such as KrustyLoader, to provide backdoors enabling lines of communication between attackers and their malicious C2 severs [6]. It is unsurprising, then, that it has also been leveraged to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, including critical vulnerabilities in the Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure services.

In early 2024, Darktrace observed the malicious use of Sliver C2 during an investigation into post-exploitation activity on customer networks affected by the Ivanti vulnerabilities. Fortunately for affected customers, Darktrace DETECT™ was able to recognize the suspicious network-based connectivity that emerged alongside Sliver C2 usage and promptly brought it to the attention of customer security teams for remediation.

How does Silver C2 work?

Given its open-source nature, the Sliver C2 framework is extremely easy to access and download and is designed to support multiple operating systems (OS), including MacOS, Windows, and Linux [4].

Sliver C2 generates implants (aptly referred to as ‘slivers’) that operate on a client-server architecture [1]. An implant contains malicious code used to remotely control a targeted device [5]. Once a ‘sliver’ is deployed on a compromised device, a line of communication is established between the target device and the central C2 server. These connections can then be managed over Mutual TLS (mTLS), WireGuard, HTTP(S), or DNS [1] [4]. Sliver C2 has a wide-range of features, which include dynamic code generation, compile-time obfuscation, multiplayer-mode, staged and stageless payloads, procedurally generated C2 over HTTP(S) and DNS canary blue team detection [4].

Why Do Attackers Use Sliver C2?

Amidst the multitude of reasons why malicious actors opt for Sliver C2 over its counterparts, one stands out: its relative obscurity. This lack of widespread recognition means that security teams may overlook the threat, failing to actively search for it within their networks [3] [5].

Although the presence of Sliver C2 activity could be representative of authorized and expected penetration testing behavior, it could also be indicative of a threat actor attempting to communicate with its malicious infrastructure, so it is crucial for organizations and their security teams to identify such activity at the earliest possible stage.

Darktrace’s Coverage of Sliver C2 Activity

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection means that it does not explicitly attempt to attribute or distinguish between specific C2 infrastructures. Despite this, Darktrace was able to connect Sliver C2 usage to phases of an ongoing attack chain related to the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances in January 2024.

Around the time that the zero-day Ivanti vulnerabilities were disclosed, Darktrace detected an internal server on one customer network deviating from its expected pattern of activity. The device was observed making regular connections to endpoints associated with Pulse Secure Cloud Licensing, indicating it was an Ivanti server. It was observed connecting to a string of anomalous hostnames, including ‘cmjk3d071amc01fu9e10ae5rt9jaatj6b.oast[.]live’ and ‘cmjft14b13vpn5vf9i90xdu6akt5k3pnx.oast[.]pro’, via HTTP using the user agent ‘curl/7.19.7 (i686-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.63.0 OpenSSL/1.0.2n zlib/1.2.7’.

Darktrace further identified that the URI requested during these connections was ‘/’ and the top-level domains (TLDs) of the endpoints in question were known Out-of-band Application Security Testing (OAST) server provider domains, namely ‘oast[.]live’ and ‘oast[.]pro’. OAST is a testing method that is used to verify the security posture of an application by testing it for vulnerabilities from outside of the network [7]. This activity triggered the DETECT model ‘Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services’, which breaches when a device is observed sending DNS requests for, or connecting to, ‘request bin’ services. Malicious actors often abuse such services to tunnel data via DNS or HTTP requests. In this specific incident, only two connections were observed, and the total volume of data transferred was relatively low (2,302 bytes transferred externally). It is likely that the connections to OAST servers represented malicious actors testing whether target devices were vulnerable to the Ivanti exploits.

The device proceeded to make several SSL connections to the IP address 103.13.28[.]40, using the destination port 53, which is typically reserved for DNS requests. Darktrace recognized that this activity was unusual as the offending device had never previously been observed using port 53 for SSL connections.

Model Breach Event Log displaying the ‘Application Protocol on Uncommon Port’ DETECT model breaching in response to the unusual use of port 53.
Figure 1: Model Breach Event Log displaying the ‘Application Protocol on Uncommon Port’ DETECT model breaching in response to the unusual use of port 53.

Figure 2: Model Breach Event Log displaying details pertaining to the ‘Application Protocol on Uncommon Port’ DETECT model breach, including the 100% rarity of the port usage.
Figure 2: Model Breach Event Log displaying details pertaining to the ‘Application Protocol on Uncommon Port’ DETECT model breach, including the 100% rarity of the port usage.

Further investigation into the suspicious IP address revealed that it had been flagged as malicious by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [8]. In addition, OSINT sources also identified that the JARM fingerprint of the service running on this IP and port (00000000000000000043d43d00043de2a97eabb398317329f027c66e4c1b01) was linked to the Sliver C2 framework and the mTLS protocol it is known to use [4] [5].

An Additional Example of Darktrace’s Detection of Sliver C2

However, it was not just during the January 2024 exploitation of Ivanti services that Darktrace observed cases of Sliver C2 usages across its customer base.  In March 2023, for example, Darktrace detected devices on multiple customer accounts making beaconing connections to malicious endpoints linked to Sliver C2 infrastructure, including 18.234.7[.]23 [10] [11] [12] [13].

Darktrace identified that the observed connections to this endpoint contained the unusual URI ‘/NIS-[REDACTED]’ which contained 125 characters, including numbers, lower and upper case letters, and special characters like “_”, “/”, and “-“, as well as various other URIs which suggested attempted data exfiltration:

‘/upload/api.html?c=[REDACTED] &fp=[REDACTED]’

  • ‘/samples.html?mx=[REDACTED] &s=[REDACTED]’
  • ‘/actions/samples.html?l=[REDACTED] &tc=[REDACTED]’
  • ‘/api.html?gf=[REDACTED] &x=[REDACTED]’
  • ‘/samples.html?c=[REDACTED] &zo=[REDACTED]’

This anomalous external connectivity was carried out through multiple destination ports, including the key ports 443 and 8888.

Darktrace additionally observed devices on affected customer networks performing TLS beaconing to the IP address 44.202.135[.]229 with the JA3 hash 19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e. According to OSINT sources, this JA3 hash is associated with the Golang TLS cipher suites in which the Sliver framework is developed [14].

Schlussfolgerung

Despite its relative novelty in the threat landscape and its lesser-known status compared to other C2 frameworks, Darktrace has demonstrated its ability effectively detect malicious use of Sliver C2 across numerous customer environments. This included instances where attackers exploited vulnerabilities in the Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure services.

While human security teams may lack awareness of this framework, and traditional rules and signatured-based security tools might not be fully equipped and updated to detect Sliver C2 activity, Darktrace’s Self Learning AI understands its customer networks, users, and devices. As such, Darktrace is adept at identifying subtle deviations in device behavior that could indicate network compromise, including connections to new or unusual external locations, regardless of whether attackers use established or novel C2 frameworks, providing organizations with a sliver of hope in an ever-evolving threat landscape.

Credit to Natalia Sánchez Rocafort, Cyber Security Analyst, Paul Jennings, Principal Analyst Consultant

Appendices

DETECT Model Coverage

  • Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days
  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Server Activity on New Non-Standard Port
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing
  • Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Compromise / Possible Malware HTTP Comms
  • Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services
  • Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP
  • Device / New User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Numeric File Download
  • Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External
  • Anomalous Server Activity / New Internet Facing System

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

18.234.7[.]23 - Destination IP - Likely C2 Server

103.13.28[.]40 - Destination IP - Likely C2 Server

44.202.135[.]229 - Destination IP - Likely C2 Server

References

[1] https://bishopfox.com/tools/sliver

[2] https://vk9-sec.com/how-to-set-up-use-c2-sliver/

[3] https://www.scmagazine.com/brief/sliver-c2-framework-gaining-traction-among-threat-actors

[4] https://github[.]com/BishopFox/sliver

[5] https://www.cybereason.com/blog/sliver-c2-leveraged-by-many-threat-actors

[6] https://securityaffairs.com/158393/malware/ivanti-connect-secure-vpn-deliver-krustyloader.html

[7] https://www.xenonstack.com/insights/out-of-band-application-security-testing

[8] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/103.13.28.40/detection

[9] https://threatfox.abuse.ch/browse.php?search=ioc%3A107.174.78.227

[10] https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1074576/

[11] https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1093887/

[12] https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/846889/

[13] https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1093889/

[14] https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/issues/3330

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About the author
Natalia Sánchez Rocafort
Cyber Security Analyst
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